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ABSTRACT 
This study investigated whether credit associations are a source of competitive pressure on regional 
banks in Japanese regional lending markets. We found that credit associations pressurized regional 
banks to set lower lending interest rates in regional markets when the total deposits held by credit 
associations in a prefecture were used as a proxy for the presence of credit associations. Furthermore, 
regional banks in a prefecture where the ratio of deposits held by credit associations was more than 
20%, which is larger than the average level, were forced to set lower lending interest rates. 
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1． Introduction 
In Japan, the regional banks, i.e. first- and second-tier regional banks (corporations), and non-profit 
cooperative financial institutions are financial institutions with deep roots in the local communities. 
The former seek to maximize profits for stock holders, whereas the latter do not always seek profits 
because of their organizational basis and they receive privileges from the government. Both have the 
same financial functions and these two different types of financial institutions coexist and conduct 
business in Japanese regional lending markets. 
Some credit associations are the same size or even larger than regional banks. If credit associations 
are a source of competitive pressure on regional banks in regional lending markets, the government 
privileges given to credit associations would be unfair for the regional banks. Many previous studies 
have investigated the competitive relationships between banks and non-profit financial institutions, 
but the relationships between banks and credit associations in Japan remain unclear. 
In the present study, we conduct an empirical investigation to determine whether the presence of 
credit associations in the regional lending markets in Japan was a source of pressure on regional 
banks to set low lending interest rates. The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, we survey previous studies of the competitive relationships between banks and non-profit 
financial institutions. In Section 3, we describe our theoretical framework and present the empirical 
models and data. In Section 4, we interpret the empirical results, and we provide the summary and 
conclusions in the final section. 
 
 
2． Literature Review 
Emmons and Schmid (2000) investigated whether banks and credit unions competed in a regional 
deposit market using country-level data and concluded that both engaged in competitive 
relationships. Tokle and Tokle (2000) analyzed whether banks competed with S&Ls and credit 
unions using the bank deposit rates in Idaho and found that banks competed with these institutions, 
although the competition with credit unions was more severe than that with S&Ls. 
Feinberg (2001) examined the effects of credit unions on banks using data related to the local 
lending markets and showed that banks set lower lending rates in a region where the share of credit 
unions was higher. Feinberg and Rahman (2001) analyzed the competitive relationships between 
banks and credit unions using the Granger causality test and demonstrated that their lending rates 
affected each other. Feinberg (2003) investigated the determinants of bank lending rates using both 
market data and bank data, and showed that the presence of credit unions negatively affected bank 
lending rates. 
Hannan (2003) examined the competitive effects of credit unions on banks and thrift institutions in 
regional deposit markets and demonstrated that the presence of credit unions positively affected 
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bank and thrift deposit rates. Schmid (2005) analyzed whether the share of credit unions in a 
regional market affected deposit market concentrations and showed that a trend occurred during 
1990–2000, whereas it was absent after 2001. Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) investigated the 
competitive relationships among multimarket banks, single-market banks, and thrift institutions in 
deposit markets and found that competition between the same types of financial institutions was 
more severe than that among different types, while thrift institutions appeared to be competitively 
distinct from both multimarket banks and single-market banks in most cases. 
 
 
3． Methodology and Data 
3.1 Methodology 
In the present study, we use the same theoretical framework as that used in Feinberg (2001, 2003). In 
imperfect competition models, an increased number of fringe suppliers in a market will lead to lower 
prices. When we apply this model to Japanese regional lending markets, the increased number of 
credit associations as fringe suppliers relative to banks leads to lower lending rates. We formalize 
this effect using a modified version of the dominant firm-price leadership model. 
We assume that the demand for loans is a homogeneous product and that credit associations act as 
fringe suppliers, so the Lerner Index of banks can be presented as follows1: 
 
CA
tionkConcentraLI
CAεη +=                            (1)         
 
where Concentration is the market concentration index and CA is the presence of credit associations. 
On the basis of equation (1), a higher presence of credit associations in a market leads to a lower 
Lerner Index, which is the lending rate of banks in this study. The present study aims to conduct an 
empirical investigation to determine whether this trend occurs in Japanese regional lending markets. 
In the present study, we estimate equation (2) on the basis of the theoretical framework used by 
panel analysis. The samples are derived from regional banks and pooled data for 2005–2010. 
 
 Interestrateit = c0 + c1 Concentrationit + c2 CAit + c3 logAsset it + c4 HoldingDumit 
          + c5 logPopulationit + c6 Callratet-0.25                 (2) 
 
Here subscript i refers to bank i and subscript t refers to year t. Interestrate is the lending interest 
rate. 
Concentration is the degree of market concentration in a prefecture where the headquarters of bank i 
                                                  
1 See Feinberg (2001, 2003) for description of the processes leading to equation (1). 
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are located. As a proxy of Concentration, we first use the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) which 
is calculated using deposit data from the first- and second-tier regional banks and credit associations 
with headquarters located in a prefecture where the headquarters of bank i are located. However, the 
deposit data for each bank and credit association used to calculate HHI include deposits made 
outside the prefecture where the headquarters are located. The deposit data for large banks, i.e. city 
banks and trust banks, could not be used to calculate HHI. For these reasons, HHI might not 
sufficiently accurate to precisely measure the market concentration. Therefore, as a proxy for 
Concentration, we also use the deposit share of the largest banks in a prefecture which is calculated 
by dividing it by the sum of the deposits in large banks, first- and second-tier regional banks and 
credit associations in a prefecture (Top1share)2. If the competition is severe in less concentrated 
regions, the coefficient of Concentration will take a positive sign. 
CA is the presence of credit associations in a prefecture where the headquarters of bank i are located. 
Proxies for this measure are as follows: (1) The sum of deposits held by credit associations in a 
prefecture (CAsize). (2) A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 when the ratio of deposits held 
by credit associations in a prefecture relative to the sum of those held by large banks, first- and 
second-tier regional banks and credit associations in the prefecture is more than 20%, which is larger 
than the average ratio, i.e. 17%, while the dummy variable takes a value of 0 when that ratio is less 
than 20% (CAshareDum). The coefficient of CA will be negative if credit associations are a source 
of pressure on regional banks to set lower lending rates in the regional markets. 
Asset is an asset of bank i and a proxy for scale. If larger banks enjoy economies of scale, these 
banks might return their reduced costs to their customers by setting lower lending rates. Therefore, 
the coefficient of Asset will take a negative sign. 
HoldingDum is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 when a bank is affiliated with a bank 
holding company, whereas it takes a value of 0 when a bank is an independent bank. If banks 
affiliated with bank holding companies can realize efficiencies, they might reflect them in their 
lending rates. Therefore, the coefficient of HoldingDum will be negative. 
Population is the population in the prefecture where the headquarters of bank i are located and is 
used as a proxy of market size. If larger markets need more money, the lending rates will tend to be 
higher in these markets. Therefore, the coefficient of Population will be positive. 
Callrate is the call money rate in the previous quarter. If banks set lending rates which are consistent 
with market rates, the coefficient of Callrate will be positive.  
 
3.2 Data 
                                                  
2 Feinberg (2001, 2003) used the top two shares in a regional market as a proxy for the degree of 
market concentration. However, we used Top1share because some prefectures only disclosed the top 
one bank in Japan so the sample size would have been smaller if we had used the top two shares. 
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Data related to the financial statements of individual banks and credit associations are derived from 
the Nikkei NEEDS. Data absent from Nikkei NEEDS are supplemented using the ‘Analysis of 
Financial Statements of All Banks’ edited by the Japanese Bankers Association and ‘Financial 
Statements of All Credit Associations’ edited by the Consultant of Financial Books Co., Ltd. Data 
related to the deposit balances of individual banks in a prefecture where their headquarters are 
located and data related to prefectural deposit balances are obtained from the ‘Financial Map’ edited 
by the Japan Financial News Co., Ltd. Data related to the prefectural population are obtained from 
the ‘Financial Resources of a Nation’ (Minryoku) edited by Asahi Shimbun. Call money rate data are 
taken from the homepage of the Bank of Japan. 
Descriptive statistics for the data used in the present study are shown in Table1. 
 
Table1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
4． Empirical Results 
4.1 Results Obtained Using CAsize as CA 
In this section, we calculate equation (2) using CAsize as CA. We present the following two 
estimation results: (1) A case in which Interestrate is calculated by dividing the interest on the loans 
and discounts by loans and bills discounted (average balances), which is referred to as the ‘Total’. 
(2) A case in which Interestrate is calculated by dividing the interest on loans and discounts to SMEs 
and individual customers by loans to SMEs and individual customers (average balances), which is 
referred to as ‘SMEs and Individuals’3.  
The detailed method used to calculate ‘SMEs and Individuals’ is as follows. We use the disclosed 
loans to SMEs and individual customers (average balances) as the denominator. We regard the 
long-term prime rates as lending rates to large companies and estimate the interest on loans and 
discounts to large companies using the long-term prime rates and (loans and bills discounted − loans 
to SMEs and individual customers). We take interests on loans and discounts minus interests on 
loans and discounts to SMEs and individual customers as the numerator. 
The results of these estimations are shown in Table2. 
 
Table2. Estimation Results 1 
 
                                                  
3 It is natural to consider that the presence of credit associations does not affect the lending rates to 
large companies set by regional banks because credit associations do not lend to large companies. 
Therefore, credit associations might only be a source of competitive pressure for lending to SMEs 
and individuals by regional banks. So, we also estimated equation (2) using the lending rates to 
SMEs and individuals to calculate Interestrate. 
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In all of these cases, the coefficients of CAsize are negative and significant at the 1% level4. 
Therefore, the regional banks located in a prefecture where the deposit sizes of credit associations 
are larger tended to set lower lending rates and the presence of credit associations in a regional 
lending market is a source of competitive pressure on regional banks. 
As a proxy of the market concentration, the coefficient of Top1share takes a significantly negative 
sign at the 1% level in the ‘Total’ estimation results, while the coefficient of HHI takes a 
significantly positive sign at the 5% level in the ‘SMEs and Individuals’ estimation results. 
Therefore, we cannot conclude that the market concentration is always an important factor when 
setting lending rates. However, if the latter results are reliable, the regional banks in more 
competitive markets might be forced to set lower lending rates. 
The coefficients of Asset in all estimates took a significantly negative sign at the 1% level. Larger 
regional banks can reduce the costs so they can still make profits if they set lower lending rates. 
The coefficients of Population in the three cases are positive and significant at the 1% level. This 
may have been because the money needs are high in larger markets so the regional banks can set 
higher lending rates in these markets. 
The coefficients of Callrate took a significantly positive sign at the 1% or 5% level. Therefore, the 
regional banks set their lending rates by considering the market rates. 
 
4.2 Results Obtained Using CAshareDum as CA 
Equation (2) is estimated using CAshareDum as CA. The estimated results are shown in Table3.  
 
Table3. Estimation Results 2 
 
The coefficients of CAshareDum took a significantly negative sign at the 1% or 5% level5 . 
Therefore, the regional banks in a prefecture where the proportion of deposits in credit associations 
is more than 20%, i.e. greater than the average ratio, experienced pressure to set lower lending rates. 
The same trend occurs when the ratio of credit associations in the regional market is employed as a 
proxy of their presence, as described in section 4.1. 
Other variables take nearly the same signs as those in section 4.1 and are generally consistent with 
our expectations. 
 
 
                                                  
4 The coefficients of CAsize in these three cases show the results of random effect models in Table 2, 
which also took significantly negative signs at the 1% or 5% level in the results of the fixed effect 
models. 
5 The coefficient of CAshareDum in the results of the random effect model in the ‘Total’ estimation 
was also significant and negative at the 1% level in the results of the fixed effect model. 
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5． Concluding Remarks 
The present study conducted an empirical investigation of the competitive relationships between 
regional banks and non-profit-making credit associations in Japanese regional lending markets. 
It was shown that credit associations were a source of competitive pressure on regional banks in the 
regional lending markets when the deposit size of credit associations in a prefecture was used as a 
proxy of the presence of credit associations. We also found that regional banks with headquarters 
located in a prefecture where the ratio of deposits held by credit associations in the market was more 
than 20%, i.e. larger than the average level, were forced to set lower lending rates. 
These results suggested that regional banks might consider that the tax and other privileges given by 
governments to credit associations are unfair. Therefore, governments might have to reconsider the 
privileges given to credit associations to promote fair competition among regional financial 
institutions in the regional lending markets. 
The competitive relationships among the same types of financial institutions such as credit 
associations in the regional lending markets should be investigated in future work. 
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Table1. Descriptive Statistics 
  Interestrate SMEs Interestrate Top1share HHI CAsize 
Mean  2.221  2.254  40.585  4005.340 28328.15 
Median  2.165  2.208  44.274  4016.699 11200 
Maximum  4.261  4.669  70.720  27317.090 197361 
Minimum  1.477  1.400  1.044  598.785 1390 
Std. Dev.  0.360  0.421  16.859  2050.360 40160 
Observations  656  656  656  656  656 
 
CAshareDum Asset HoldingDum Population Callrate 
0.299 2610351 0.099 3138775 0.177 
0 2092965 0 1948250 0.101 
1 11693332 1 12609912 0.497 
0 183391 0 595331 0.001 
0.458 2169944 0.299 2889797 0.172 
 656  656  656  656  656 
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Table2. Estimation Results 1 
Interestrate Total SMEs and Individuals 
 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Constant 
22.301** 
 (2.392) 
3.034*** 
(4.559) 
3.344*** 
(3.152) 
3.316*** 
(4.278) 
Top1share 
−0.024*** 
(−3.777) 
 
0.001 
(0.352) 
 
HHI  
0.000 
(0.085) 
 
0.000** 
(2.077) 
CAsize 
−0.442***  
(−3.788) 
−0.145*** 
(−3.881) 
−0.133*** 
(−2.998) 
−0.140*** 
(−3.216) 
Asset 
−0.234*** 
(−3.477) 
−0.251*** 
(−9.647) 
−0.279*** 
(−9.057) 
−0.278*** 
(−9.123) 
HoldingDum 
−0.001 
(−0.042) 
−0.014 
(−0.481) 
0.011 
(0.308) 
0.011 
(0.299) 
Population 
−0.792 
(−1.305) 
0.283*** 
(4.890) 
0.283*** 
(3.598) 
0.289*** 
(4.276) 
Callrate 
0.210*** 
(8.421) 
0.201*** 
(8.212) 
0.068** 
(2.107) 
0.069** 
(2.132) 
Observations 656 656 656 656 
χ2 statistics 20.149*** 7.408 8.610 8.621 
Selected Model 
Fixed Effect 
Model 
Random Effect 
Model 
Random Effect 
Model 
Random Effect 
Model 
Adjusted-R2 0.915 0.203 0.129 0.134 
Notes: *Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table3. Estimation Results 2 
Interestrate Total SMEs and Individuals 
 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Constant 
10.332 
 (1.205) 
4.495*** 
(8.433) 
4.530*** 
(4.443) 
4.724*** 
(7.612) 
Top1share 
−0.024*** 
(−3.744) 
 
0.001 
(0.507) 
 
HHI  
−0.000 
(−0.142) 
 
0.000* 
(1.899) 
CAshareDum 
−0.134**  
(−2.245) 
−0.123*** 
(−3.122) 
−0.134*** 
(−2.754) 
−0.137*** 
(−2.848) 
Asset 
−0.284*** 
(−4.275) 
−0.260*** 
(−10.083) 
−0.288*** 
(−9.429) 
−0.287*** 
(−9.456) 
HoldingDum 
−0.013 
(−0.434) 
−0.015 
(−0.529) 
0.012 
(0.322) 
0.012 
(0.313) 
Population 
−0.208 
(−0.359) 
0.101*** 
(3.129) 
0.126** 
(1.973) 
0.113*** 
(3.014) 
Callrate 
0.189*** 
(7.593) 
0.189*** 
(7.673) 
0.057* 
(1.742) 
0.057* 
(1.746) 
Observations 656 656 656 656 
χ2 statistics 16.663** 3.408 6.371 5.968 
Selected Model 
Fixed Effect 
Model 
Random Effect 
Model 
Random Effect 
Model 
Random Effect 
Model 
Adjusted-R2 0.914 0.198 0.128 0.131 
Notes: *Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level. 
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